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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U'TAH
SARAH MARGARET DEWEESE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No.

100917
J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STA'rEMENT OF FACTS
A.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
Appellant's statement of facts is characterized by
misinterpretation of the evidence, and by unwarranted
inferences. This is true even though plaintiff as the prevailing party is entitled to a consideration of the evidence
and inferences in a light most favorable to her. We,
therefore, deem it necessary to restate the facts.
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B.

THE FACTS

Sarah !Iargaret DeWeese brought this action for
personal injuries received from slipping and falling
on the terrazzo entranceway to defendant's store at 213
South !fain Street on November 30, 1953. At that time
the DeWeese family lived at 1275 E1nerson Avenue and
had lived in Salt Lake City for a little over a year (R. 17,
70). On the evening of November 30, 1953, Mrs. De'Veese went to town in order to do some shopping and
meet her husband after work. Her husband was the
Assistant Manager of the W. T. Grant store. He was
scheduled to get off work at between 9 :15 and 9 :30 P.M.
(R. 17). Mrs. DeWeese caught a bus at 13th East and
Emerson A venue. Emerson A venue is located between
13th and 17th South Streets. Plaintiff boarded the bus
at around 8:00 P.M. She stated that after the bus had
traveled from one to one and a half blocks, it started to
snow, with large flakes melting as they hit the ground
(R. 18). She dismounted from the bus at Second South
and State. It was still snowing at that time.
She stated that it ~usually takes the bus from
fifteen to twenty minutes to take her to town (R. 34).
Mrs. DeWeese, afer getting off the bus, walked from
State Street to :Niain Street and turned South on Main
Street, proceeding to defendant's store. As she walked
from State Street to J. C. Penney's she noticed that the
sidewalks were damp and wet to the point where, although water was not running off the sidewalk in a heavy
flow, there would be puddles in breaks in the sidewalk
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R. 18, 35). Plaintiff was holding her hand over her
hair to keep it dry and it still got wet (R. 37). She noticed
as she started in the entranceway that there was an incline and that the terrazzo was damp and wet (R. 19).
'Vhen she had walked from two to five feet on the
terrazzo, her right foot suddenly slipped forward, and
she fell straight down with her left leg folded under
(R. 20). When plaintiff fell, she noticed that there were
some 1nuddy streaks on the surface of the terrazzo, apparently tracks of people walking in and out (R. 39).
There were customers standing around in the entranceway, one of whom helped her up. She then limped into
the store. There were muddy stains on her leg, slip and
the inside lining of her coat and dress (R. 21). Inside
the store, plaintiff told the girl at the glove counter of
her fall and asked to use the telephone. She called her
husband at Grant's and he immediately came up to Penney's. As l\ir. De vVeese left Grant's and proceeded to J.
C. Penney's, he noticed that it was ~nowing large flakes,
which were not sticking and that the sidewalk was wet
(R. 79). As he entered the entranceway of Penney's on
the terrazzo "pretty fast," he almost slipped and fell himself, "it was that slick" (R. 80). Mr. DeWeese noticed
that there was no rubber mat on the surface of the terrazzo (R. 82). Jack Davies, an employee of defendant,
approached Mrs. DeWeese and asked her if there were
rubber mats on the entranceway, and she answered in
the negative (R. 21, 83). Davies then went to the front
door and looked out. He came back past Mr. and Mrs.
DeWeese, went into a closet and came back with a bucket
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filled with a white powdery substance known to Mr.
De \Veese as feldspar, took it out to the terrazzo and
spread it on the surface (R. 22, 84). While this was going
on, ~fr. and l\tfrs. De \Yeese were at the glove counter just
inside the door (R. 82).
From this fall ~Irs. De vV eese suffered a severe injury to the lumbosacral area of her back. The medical
evidence is that as a result of her injuries it will be
necessary for her to undergo a spinal fusion operation
(R. 57).
T,errrazzo surfaces beoome slippery when wet

Frank Caffall had been employed as a tile contractor
1n Salt Lake City for some forty-three years. During
that time he had done quite a few jobs of laying terrazzo
surfaces. He testified that terrazzo is made of cement,
marble chips and a suitable color, and is laid in a plastic
form. After it is set, it is ground with carborundun1 stones
with electric machines, using a finer grit as the grinding
proceeds to give it a smooth surface and a polish (R. 93,
94). Caffall testified that terrazzo without non-slip material such as carborundum and London grit is very slick
and that the addition of non-slip material will make it
less slick. He further stated that water or moisture on
the surface of terrazzo with grit will make the surface
more slippery. A small amount of water will make the
surface slicker than a large amount of water for the
reason that a small amount of water will not clean off the
film of mud or other impurities which increase slipperiness (R. 95, 97, 103, 104). Mr. Caffall stated at R. 103:
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"Then, when the terrazzo is combed down
smooth and it has these grits in there, the grits,
of course, are exposed to your feet as you walk
across them, and when they get damp, of course,
they get more slick. The material is more slick."
Further, Caffall testified that ordinary wear and use of
a terrazzo surface over a long period of time makes the
surface smoother and also wears smoother any grit material in the terrazzo (R. 99, 102). Caffall testified that
although other surface materials such as cement may be
as slippery when wet as terrazzo, the slipperiness when
wet will increase with the smoothness of the finish (R.
100, 101, 103).
On cross examination, Caffall testified (R. 101) :

"Q. You know, from what you have gathered that
a cement sidewalk and terrazzo surface have
approximately the same coefficient of friction
when wet?
A.

Well, I can't answer that 'yes' or 'no', depends upon the smoothness of it and how it
has been ground down. Cement can he-can
be ground down very smooth and be very
slippery, same as terrazzo. ·Either one of
them can be left rough with abrasive in them
and be more non-slick."

Peter Evans had been employed by W. T. Grant
Company for 24 years performing duties in maintenance
of building and equipment. During this time he observed
the terrazzo surfaces of the entranceway of Grant's and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
other stores in downtown Salt Lake. From such observations he was well acquainted with the general propensities of terrazzo (R. 91, 92). Evans testified at R. 92:

"Q. Now, based upon your experience and your
observations with respect to terrazzo, generally, can you state what, if any, effect water
or wetness has on a terrazzo surface f
A.

Makes it slippery."

Prior to coming to Salt Lake City in October of 1952
as Assistant Manager, Mr. DeWeese had worked for
W. T. Grant Company as a trainee manager and assistant
manager at Roanoke, Virginia, Greensboro, North Carolina, Richmond, Virginia, Williamsburg, Virginia, Winchester, Virginia, Newport News, Virginia, and Atlanta,
Georgia. At the time of trial he was Manager of theW.
T. Grant store at Bellflower, California. At these various stores Mr. De Weese had become acquainted with
terrazzo surfaces as a part of his duties and stated that
water or moisture on these surfaces makes them slick.
Rubber Mats and/or anti-slip compounds in common US'e
will eliminate slipperiness of wet terrazzo surfaces

Peter Evans testified as to the means and measures
generally used to reduce slipperiness of terrazzo surfaces
caused by wetness. He stated that the means he had become acquainted with were putting out rubber mats and
using an anti-slip compound known as "feldspar." Feldspar is a gritty granulated substance made of ground
granite. He stated that this substance acts as a brake
on slipperiness (R. 92, 93).
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Caffall testified that he had had occasion to make a
general survey of the business establishments on Main
Street and that about 85 percent had terrazzo entrances
(R. 94).
:Mr. DeWeese testified from his experience that rubber mats or abrasive anti-slip compounds were available
for use on terrazzo surfaces to correct any slickness
caused by moisture or water, that these devices were in
common use and would make it next to impossible to slip
(R. 77). He stated that the two most commonly used
compounds are "feldspar" and "Never Slip." From his
experience in Salt Lake City, both before and after his
wife was injured, DeWeese observed that most business
establishments on Main Street between South Temple
and Third South used rubber mats in inclement weather
(R. 78). He stated that theW. T. Grant Company used
both rubber mats and feldspar on its terrazzo entranceway during the time that he was employed there.
The custom and practice at J. C. Penney Company
was to use rubber mats and/ or non-slip compound on its
terrazzo in inclement weather. This is indicated by
Davies' words and actions immediately following Mrs.
De \Veese's fall. One of the first questions Davies asked
l\Irs. DeWeese was if the rubber mats were out (R. 21,
83). Then Davies proceeded out to see the terrazzo and
went back to a closet, where he obtained a bucket filled
with a white powdery substance, which Mr. DeWeese
recognized as "feldspar." Davies took the bucket out to
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the terrazzo and spread "feldspar" on the entranceway
(R. 84). Davies was not called as a witness by defendant
nor were any other of defendant's employees called to
testify. Furthermore, Defendant in its brief (P. 19, 20)
admitted that J. C. Penney Company had such a custom.
Defendant's terrazzo entranceway was wet and slippery
at the time plaintiff was injured

Mrs. DeWeese testified as to her fall, as follows (R.
20):

"Q. Will you state exactly what happened as you
proceeded into the north entrance-way there?
A.

I was just walking along normally, minding
my own business, and I noticed the floor was
wet, but never thought about it being slick or
anything like that.

Q. And what happened?
A.

And the next thing I knew, I was down after
I had gone two or three feet inside the entrance.

Q. Will you describe how you came to fall¥
A.

Well, I landed more or less like a parachute;
everything I had went out.

* * * *
Q. Will you describe exactly how you fell¥
A.

My right foot went forward and my left leg
folded under me.

Q.

And how did you land?

A.

Flat."
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And on cross examination (R. 38) :

"Q. Mrs. DeWeese, you say your right foot slipped¥
A.

That's right.

Q. It went
A.

forward~

That's right.

Q. Not to the
A.

rear~

Went forward.

Q. And what happened to your left leg 1
A. It folded under me."
l\1rs. DeWeese noticed that the terrazzo surface was
damp and wet. After she had fallen, she noticed some
muddy streaks on the surface (R. 39).
Both Mr. and I\frs. DeWeese testified that there was
no rubber mat on the terrazzo (R. 21, 82).
Mr. DeWeese, a few minutes after the fall, proceeded
into the southern part of the main entrance of Penney's
"pretty fast" and "I almost fell down myself, it was that
slick." (R. 80).
Mrs. DeWeese testified that there was an incline
from commencement of the terrazzo up to the door (R.
19). She stated at R. 30:
"Well, it is high enough, I noticed I was going
up an incline."
l\1r. DeWeese testified as to the slope of the terrazzo (R. 80):
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"A sloping incline, noticeable to the naked
eye."
It was stipulated in Court by counsel that the slope
of the terrazzo at the point where Mrs. DeWeese slipped
was four inches in ten feet from the sidewalk up towards the door, and that the sidewalk in front of Penney's
sloped downward to the south at a rate of 5.5 inches in
ten feet (R. 29). As a result, Mrs. DeWeese proceeded
from one slope to another as she stepped from the sidewalk on to the terrazzo.
Mr. DeWeese stated that a slope on wet terrazzo
surface, as far as footing is concerned, makes it "hard
to walk on" (R. 81).
Evidence was offered and received of an answer to
an interrogatory that the terrazzo at J. C. Penney Company was installed in the year 1936 (R. 86, 87). Caffall
testified that terrazzo surfaces become smoother with
wear and that grit materials also wear down (R. 99).
The entranceway in question had been remodeled
some time before trial and a different surface is now
on said entranceway (R. 98, 99). Caffall examined a border around the new surface. He stated that this appeared
to be an old surface. He felt this surface and it was
"quite smooth" (R. 100). He could not detect any London
grit. He stated that it would be difficult to detect carborundum because the surface was black in color, as is
carborundum (R. 99).
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Misstatements in the Brief of Appellant

At page 7 of the Brief of Appellant counsel states
that :\fr. Caffall testified that "terrazzo when wet was
just about as slippery as a sidewalk." Caffall made no
such statement. lie testified that cement could be as
slippery if it was ground and polished to the same degree
(R. 101).
On page 8 defendant claims as fact that terrazzo
is less slippery when worn. It is true that defendant's
paid expert slanted some answers in that direction (R.
114) even though he made no categorical statement that
this terrazzo would be less slippery when worn. Plaintiff's witness, on the other hand, stated that wear and
use of a terrazzo surface makes it more slippery regardless of the presence or absence of carborundum (R.
99, 102) and the jury was entitled to and did believe
plaintiff's evidence on this issue.
On page 9, defendant states that Mrs. DeWeese "categorized" the precipitation as a "mist." This statement
is utterly false. Mrs. DeWeese stated that the precipitation was a snow that was melting before or as it hit the
ground. The only mention made of a mist was by counsel for defendant when he was taking plaintiff's deposition and was questioning her as to how wet the sidewalks
were and she stated: "More than just being like mist
or something like that." Counsel then asked plaintiff
what she interpreted a mist to be. At trial when counsel was cross examining Mrs. DeWeese by reading from
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the deposition, he ornitted to read his question as to
what she interpreted a mist to be. When this remarkable omission was called to his attention, he inserted the
question in the record (R. 36). It can easily be seen
from the deposition and the record that Mrs. DeWeese
in no way "categorized" the precipitation as a 1nist. This
was strictly counsel's own doing.

Tl

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION AS
TO DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE.

I,.

POINT II.

I.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION AS
TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.
(a) THE EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM AND USAGE ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL ·COURT WAS PROPER.

·l

(b) DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCEDED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL TO BE "PERFECTLY ADMISSIBLE", AND STIPULATED TO BE TRUE.

I

POINT IV.
DEFENDANT IS FORECLOSED FROM OBJECTING TO
ADMISSION OF LOCAL CUSTOM AND USAGE EVIDENCE
BY COUNSEL'S F AlLURE TO EXCEPT TO SUCH EVIDENCE AND BY HIS F AlLURE TO REQUEST A LIMITING
INSTRUCTION.
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ARGr:MENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION AS
TO DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE.

Two cases establish the Utah law where terrazzo
surfaces are involved. They are Erickson v. Walgreen
Drug Co., (1951) ______ U. ______ , 232 P. 2d 210, and W. T.
Grant Co. v. J{arren, C.C.A. lOth (1951), 190 F. 2d, 710.
Counsel for defendant in his brief has attempted to side
step these cases and to fit the case at bar into the clearly distinguishable "puddle of water" or "foreign substance" type of case. This court specifically distinguished the two in the Erickson case when it stated at
232 P. 2d 212:
"This is not the case of a business visitor slipping on some foreign substance such as oil, which
had carelessly been spilled on the floor only a
short time prior to the accident."
Defendant further cites the recent case of Lindsay v.
Eccles Hotel Company, 3 U. 2d 364, 284 P. 2d 477, as
authority when the court specifically held it to be a
"foreign substance" case.
The facts in the case at bar are almost identical with
the facts of the Erickson case. Here, as in the Erickson
case, there was testimony that terrazzo surfaces become
slippenr when wet. In both cases there was testimony
that any grit material in terrazzo loses its effectiveness
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to prevent slipping with wear. The terrazzo in the case
at bar had been in use for approximately 14 years. In
both cases there was evidence of a custom existing in
Salt Lake City on Main Street for stores having terrazzo
entrances to use rubber mats and/or non-slip aggregates.
In the Erickson case, there was a slope of only 1/16 of an
inch to the foot, or o/8 of an inch in ten feet. In the case
at bar, the slope was four inches in ten feet, or nearly
seven times as great. In the Erickson case there was no
evidence of a custom of using rubber mats or non-slip
aggregate at the vV algreen store entrance. In the case
at bar there was evidence by the actions of defendant's
employee of such a custom at J. C. Penney's. Furthermore, counsel for defendant in his brief, on page 19
states:
"Admittedly the defendant, J. C. Penney
Company used mats and Feldspar during inclement weather, * * *"
Defendant maintains that there was no evidence that
defendant's terrazzo was slick and slippery at the time
of Mrs. DeWeese's fall. This remarkable contention ignores the testimony of Mrs. DeWeese that she slipped on
this floor, that her foot slipped right out from under
her, and of 1\fr. DeWeese that he slipped and almost fell
on the same terrazzo on his way in shortly after Mrs.
DeWeese's fall, and his further testimony that this terrazzo surface was slick. Certainly Davies would not have
performed the useless act of throwing feldspar on a dry
non-slippery surface. It will be remembered that this
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surface was ren1oved and replaced some time prior to
trial. Counsel for defendant did not offer to bring a
piece of it to court or explain why he did not. In fact,
the only witness produced by defendant was Dr. Harris,
who performed laboratory tests on the terrazzo at a different time and under different circumstances and without taking account of the slope or the problems of a
person walking. As far as the record shows, Dr. Harris
merely placed weights on various shoes and pushed them
along the surface. The jury was not required to give
any weight to such testimony. The original border of the
terrazzo remained. Caffill examined it and stated that it
was "quite smooth" and that he could detect no carborundum. Defendant offered no testimony as to any carborundmn or non-slip aggregate being a component of the
terrazzo.
These facts provided the jury with a solid foundation for finding as fact the elements required in Section
343 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Torts:

"A possessor of land is subject to liability
for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only
if, he
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable
care could discover, the condition which, if known
to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them, and
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(b) has no reason to believe they will discover the condition or realize the risk involved
therein, and
(c) invites or permits them to enter or reInain upon the land without exercising reasonable
care
(i) to make the condition reasonably
safe, or
(ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm * * * ."
Defendant is charged with knowledge that its terrazzo entranceway was ground to a smooth finish, that
it was on a slope, and that when it became damp or wet
the surface became dangerously slick and slippery. Defendant also knew that large numbers of its invitees could
be expected at all times during business hours to be
using its entranceway. Under these circumstances defendant owed a duty of alert, attentive, watchfulness for
signs of inclement weather as well as for inclement
weather, so it could put out the mats and feldspar in
plenty of time to avoid danger. Taking the evidence most
favorable to plaintiff it had been raining and snowing
approximately twenty minutes before plaintiff dismounted from the bus at State Street and Second South.
It had started to rain and snow when the bus had
gone about a block or a block and a half and it usually
took the bus fifteen to twenty minutes to make the trip
to town. It probably took plaintiff another five or ten
minutes to walk the block and a half to defendant's store.
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During this twenty-five to thirty minutes customers were
continuously walking into the store with the dampness
and wetness on their feet, hair and clothing. The store
had its usual employees at the front as well as the rear
of the store. They could see out the windows. Under
such circumstances the jury was unquestionably justified
in finding that defendant by the exercise of reasonable
care could have discovered the dangerous condition existing at its entranceway. It would have (aken less than a
minute to bring out the mats and/ or sprinkle the entrance with feldspar, or to warn patrons of the dangerous
condition.
Defendant had no reason to believe that invitees
would discover or realize the risk involved in walking on
the terrazzo entranceway. Slickness is not a thing that
can always be seen. It is something that is felt. Wet
terrazzo is deceptively innocent in appearance and dangerous in character. There was no evidence that plaintiff would have had any reason to discover that this
entranceway was slick in time to avoid her injury.
Plaintiff was entitled to believe that the entranceway surface was safe for use unless and until a reasonably
prudent person under like circun1stances and with like
opportunity for observation would have concluded otherwise.
Defendant's doors were open. The invitation to cross
its entranceway was extended to one and all. It was a
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soever to use readily available means to eliminate the
danger apparent to it but not apparent to its invitees.
Neither did defendant make any effort to give warning
of the danger that existed.
The facts of the Erickson case as stated on page 215
1n the dissenting opinion show that Walgreen Drug
Company had approximately thirty minutes in which
to apprise itself of the situation and remedy it. It was
stated:
"On September 25, 1948, plaintiff left her
home at approximately 2 :30 P.M., at which time
it was beginning to rain. She arrived at Second
South and l\1:ain Streets at approximately 3:00
P.l\L The streets were wet and it was still raining."
In the case of Brody v . .Albert Lifson & Sons, Inc.,
N.J. (1955), 111 A. 2d 504, the court recognized the difference in principle between the terrazzo case and the
slippery foreign substance case. The court pointed out
that in the puddle of water or foreign substance case the
dangerous condition is ordinarily equally open to discovery by both the store owner and the invitee for the
reason that the slipperiness is caused by the puddle of
water or foreign substance with the floor surface not having anything to do with the dangerous condition whereas
in the terrazzo type of case the dangerous condition is
created by the combination of a surface having the propensity to be slick and slippery when wet and an expectSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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able action of nature. The court in the Brody case cited
both the Erickson and the l{arren cases in affirming a
verdict for the plaintiff.
In the Brody case the plaintiff slipped and fell on
defendant's terrazzo entrance after business hours. She
had gone into defendant's lighted entranceway to see the
display windows. The floor surface of the entranceway
was terrazzo with a slope of 3Js of an inch to the foot,
or 33,4 inches in 10 feet. Plaintiff's expert testified that
the floor was considerably slippery when wet and that
the standard practice in wet weather was to use rubber
mats. The fall occurred on the evening of June 4, 1951,
a warm summer night. There was conflict in the testimony as to when the incident occurred and when the
rain began. Plaintiff testified that she fell at about 8 :00
P.M., that the sky was cloudy while she had been in
Newark (happened in Elizabeth), and that there had
been showers in Newark from 7 :00 P.M. on. A meteorologist testified that rain began in Elizabeth at 8:30P.M.,
but this report came from Union County Park Commission. The Chief of the Union County Park Police testified that rain started at 8:10P.M., and would be reported
on the half hour. An Elizabeth police officer testified
that the accident was reported at 8:47 P.1\L Plaintiff
testified that the surface of the terrazzo was wet and
slippery. Defendant asserted that it did not have sufficient notice. In answer to this assertion, the court stated
at page 507:
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"In the Bohm case, supra, we held that the
duty existing, frequently the result has turned upon notice of the defective condition, direct or imputed by proof of adequate opportunity to discover the defective condition * * *. It is this
principle that is invoked in the present case by the
defendant. This case, however, is not subject to
unqualified application of that philosophy. We
have not, in the circumstances here presented, a
defective condition arising either suddenly or by
wear over a period of tin1e, nor an uncommon ac-·
cumulation of water.
"The present matter lies within the confines
of the rule that a negligent act may be one which
'creates a situation which involves an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable actions of the other * * * or a force of nature.'
"In the present case there was evidence from
which a jury could reasonably infer that the con-.
struction of the floor rendered it peculiarly liable,
to become slippery by virtue of introduction of
water thereon and that defendant omitted precautions which would have been practical or
reasonable under the circumstances of this case.

* * * *

"* * *and in the present case the alleged cause
is the intrinsic quality of the material used or
condition created by the defendant u·hen exposed
to normal weather conditions. This is an intrinsic
substance case, not a foreign substance case.
Therefore, it is not ruled by the 'waxed floor',
'pool of water', 'grease spot' or 'defective or worn
tread' cases, where the foreign substance or extranormal condition of the premises is alleged to be
the cause of an injury."
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In the notice aspect of the case, the New Jersey
Court relied on the theory set out in paragraph 302 (b)
of the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts:
"A negligent act may be one which:

* * * *
"(b) creates a situation which involves an
unreasonable risk to another because of the ex-.
pectable action of the other, a third person, an
animal or a force of nature."
The case at bar deals with the expectable actions
of a force of nature. It is common knowledge that
throughout the year in this part of the country there will
be rain and snow. Wetness and a terrazzo surface when
combined cause an unusually dangerous slipping hazzard.
This hazzard is increased considerably when the terrazzo surface is sloped in a different direction than the
sidewalk approach thereto. Defendant had a duty being
the owner of this entranceway to know these facts, and
is charged with such knowledge. On the other hand,
this condition would not be apparent to the plaintiff and
defendant is also charged with this knowledge. Under
these circumstances defendant owed a duty to maintain
its entranceway at all times in a safe condition. The
means for keeping its entranceways safe were readily
available. First, defendant could remain at all times
alert to weather conditions. Second, defendant could by
proper use of mats and/or feldspar prevent a slick and
slippery condition from ever existing or in the alternative warn its customers of any dangerous condition
that may exist. The dictates of ordinary care may very
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well require under the facts of this case that rubber mats
be left on the terrazzo entranceway at all times.
The Karren case contains an interpretation by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals of the Erickson case.
The Court stated at 190 F. 2d 711:
"Here the appellee's own testimony establishes that it knew of the slippery condition of such
floors when wet and that it instructed its porter
to put additional non-skid material on the entranceway under such condition. lTnder the decision of the Supreme Court of Utah, we think it
became a question of fact for the jury's determination whether under the existing conditions appellant exercised reasonable care for the safety of
its invitees."
The l(arren case was not even cited by defendant
in its brief, and yet defendant cited an earlier case from
the Tenth Circuit which involved an inside stairway
and in which there was not even evidence of a wet surface,
Sears-Roebttck & Co. v. Johnson, 91 F. 2d, 332 (1937).
In describing the scope of defendant's duties, this
court in the Erickson case stated at page 212:
"While there is no evidence of any incident
occurring which would have put the appellant on
notice that the terrazzo was slippery when wet,
such evidence is not necessary to establish liability on the part of the appellant. The latter was
in the actual possession of the building and had a
duty to search out defects in the premises in order
that they be reasonably safe for the presence of
business visitors."
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In the Erickson case, this court cited the case of

Cardall v. Shortenberg's Inc., R.I. (1943) 69 R. I. 97, 31
A. 2d 12, as authority for its holding. The Cardall case
was also cited by the New Jersey court in the Brody
case. In the Cardall case there was a terrazzo surface
which had been laid a 1nonth or so prior to plaintiff's
fall. This surface had a slope upward from the sidewalk
to the door of from 3% to 4 inches in 10lj2 feet, less than
in the case at bar. Also there was a slight slope sideways
which is also indicated in the case at bar by the slope of
5% inches in 10 feet of the sidewalk sloping south. The
evidence as to the amount of abrasives in the terrazzo
varied from 4% to 40%. The plaintiff testified that the
terrazzo was wet and slippery at the time she fell. An
expert testified that the terrazzo would become more
slippery with water. The court in the Cardall case held
that there was a jury question as to whether or not the
terrazzo surface was dangerous in wet weather and
whether or not defendant was negligent in failing to have
a rubber mat or other protection on the terrazzo at the
time of the injury.
The dissent in the Erickson case in distinguishing
that case from the Cardall case stated at page 218:

"It might be that the case at bar could be distinguished from the Rhode Island case because of
the difference in the slope of the entranceway or
the time of the year."
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It should be pointed out that the slope in the Cardall case was less than the slope in the case at bar. The
Cardall case occurred on February 19 and the case at
bar on November 30. It is clear that the facts in the case
at bar are stronger in every detail than were the facts
in the Erickson case.
In regard to the slope situation in the case at bar,
defendant appears to believe the fact that the sidewalk
slopes down to the south with a slightly greater slope
than exists on the terrazzo, inures to its favor. This
situation, which defendant must be charged ·with knowing, made the terrazzo entranceway even more hazardous and dangerous for this gives a customer two slopes
instead of one to deal with. It can be seen that a person
walking south on the sidewalk and entering Penneys
would be walking downhill and stepping from a downhill
slope to an uphill slope to the east. This situation requires even greater care on defendant's part to avoid
injuries to its customers.
There are several cases which support and strengthen the law as laid down in the Erickson, Karren, Brody
and Cardall cases.
Th8 case of Deschan~ps et al v. L. Bamberger, N.J.
(1942) 27 A. 2d 3, involved a marble floor with a slope
of 71;4 inches in about 15 feet with no water present.
The court there held there to be a jury question of defendant's negligence in failing to have a mat or other
type of covering.
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See also the following cases where the questions of
negligence and contributory negligence were held to be
for the jury. Barker v. Silverforb, Mo. (1947), 201 S.W.
2d 408 (inherent quality of terrazzo floor considered significant coupled with other factors); Becker, et al. v.
David, C.A.D.C. (1950), 182 F. 2d 243 (hallway level
floor made slippery with water tracked in); Indemnity
Ins1trance Co. of North America v. Hinkle, C.A. 5th
(1942), 127 F. 2d 655 (sloping tile surface on foyer floor,
no water or foreign substance) ; Bankhead v. First Nat.
Bank in St. Louis, Mo. (1940), 137 S.W. 2d 594 (marble
steps inside bank, slippery from water tracked in); Picariello et al. v. Linares & Rescigno Bank, N ..J. (1941), 21
A. 2d 343 (level terassa floor inside bank made slippery
by water tracked in); Williamson v. Derry Electric Co.,
N.H. (1938), 196 A. 265 (freshly waxed level floor in
office made more slippery by water tracked in.)
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION AS
TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

The only evidence that defendant relies on in stating
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law is that she was walking normally, that she
noticed the floor was wet but didn't know it was slippery, and that her husband knows of the propensities
of terrazzo.
In the Karren case in reply to the same contention
made by the defendant the court stated (P. 711) that
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plaintiff was familiar with the entranceway in question
and no doubt had been in and out of the store on numerous occasions. The court then went on to state :

"* * * but there is no evidence in the record
supporting a finding that she was familiar with
terrazzo floors; that she had any knowledge as to
their peculiar characteristics, or knew or had reason to know that they were unduly slippery when
wet. The evidence is that she walked in an ordinary way in approaching and entering appellant's
store."
The evidence in the case at bar is practically identical to that in the Karren case. There is also the added
factor in this case that as far as the record shows plaintiff had never been in the J. C. Penney entranceway prior
to the injury. It will be remembered that 8he had only
lived in Salt Lake about one year prior to the injury.
There was no evidence that Mrs. DeWeese knew anything
about the propensities of terrazzo surfaces.
As to defendant's burden of proof on the issue of
contributory negligence see the recent case of Gordon
Ray, doing business under the name Ray Transportation
ConLpany v. Consolidated Freightways (Nov. 2, 1955)
298 P. 2d 196. In speaking of the refusal of the trial
court to find a plaintiff contributorily negligent as a
matter of law this court stated at P. 201:
"It would only be when such refusal did such
violence to common sense as to convince the court
that no fact trier acting fairly and reasonably
would refuse to make such finding that it would
be reversed."
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.
(a) THE EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM AND USAGE ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER.

Counsel for defendant, at page 19 of his brief, makes
the following statement:
"The record reveals that plaintiff sought to
influence the jury by a constant and persistent
line of questions and testimony relating to the
practice, custom and condition of W. T. Grant
stores in various localities in the United States
as well as at Salt Lake."
Counsel is utterly mistaken when he infers that
evidence of a custom and practice of W. T. Grant
stores outside Salt Lake City of using rubber mats
and/or feldspar in inclement weather on terrazzo surfaces was admitted in evidence in this case. No such
evidence is in the record. Counsel has apparently confused the evidence that Mr. DeWeese had been employed
by W. T. Grant Company at various of its stores throughout the country and that these stores had terrazzo surfaces with evidence of a custom and practice. The evidence concerning Mr. DeWeese's experience and familiarity with terrazzo surfaces was introduced for the purpose
of showing that he had a background of practical experience and knowledge with respect to the propensities and
characteristics of terrazzo surfaces. He was applying
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this experience when he testified that terrazzo surfaces
have the propensity of becoming extremely slick and
slippery when wet. His background of experience with
terrazzo was clearly proper evidence which laid a
foundation for his later testimony.
The record further reveals that counsel for defendant asked for no cautionary instructions, made no indication to the court that he felt he was prejudiced by any
offer of such evidence in the presence of the jury, and
made no motion for mistrial. As an afterthought counsel now makes some vague complaint of prejudice.
Counsel makes the following statement at page 19
of his brief:
"The beginning question was categorized by
counsel as 'preliminary' and then boldly asserted
to be admissible as a standard of care :"
Counsel then quotes the following statement by Mr.
Black as support for his contention:
{

"Mr. Black. If your Honor, please, this has
to do with a standard of care-this is evidence
of a standard of care in connection with maintenance and upkeep of terrazzo entrance-way."
Counsel for plaintiff never suggested to court or
jury that the customs and practices of other business
establishments in Salt Lake City, with respect to placing
mats and/or feldspar on terrazzo surfaces in inclement
weather was an absolute standard of care. It was eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dence which the jury could consider in deterrnining first,
whether rubber mats and/or feldspar were practical for
use in preventing slickness and slipperiness and, second,
whether rubber mats and/or feldspar were readily available to defendant for the accomplishment of such purpose.
Evidence as to the customs and practices of W. T.
Grant store and other stores in Salt Lake City of using
rubber mats and/or feldspar on terrazzo surfaces in inclement weather was introduced. Counsel for defendant
at the time of trial was much more magnanimous about
this evidence than he appears to be in his present brief.
At Record 73 he states as follows:
"We think it perfectly permissible to show
that, in this community, if he desires, we would
be glad to stipulate that mats and feldspar are
used on terrazzo during inclement weather. Certainly, we have no concern about that, but we
don't feel we should be tied to the standard of
care of that particular store, nor do we think
that the acts of one particular store, if they put
them out sooner or later-and we are talking
probably of a matter of minutes-that that thereby puts notice that J. C. Penney's would be negligent, I don't think that is possible."
The Court made the following statement outside
the presence of the jury as to the theory under which he
was admitting the foregoing evidence (R. 72):
"THE COURT: - might take this, Miss
Reporter; I think p1aintiff may show the nature
of terrazzo floors, its slickness, its tendency to
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be slicker as it is wetter, if they want to; anything with respect to the slope of it, as it affects
the risk or danger of slickness. I think he may
show what 1nay be done, if it is slick, to safeguard
against it. I think he may show what steps are
taken in this community-and, as far as that goes,
that rnay cover the State of Utah-as protection
against slipping. I think he n1ay offer as evidence
of that what is done in this vicinity by others, as
typical or illustrative. I don't think you can show
what the policy of Grant is, let us say, outside of
Utah"MR. BLACK: All right, Judge.
"THE COURT: - or what the practice generally is outside of Utah, except as it might tend
to show that a rubber mat or feldspar or something else is a safety protection, like a snow tire
on a car or a chain on a car or gravel, sand, or
cinders or salt on a hill that's a case of lessening
the danger or guarding against it. I think that's
in the proper realm of inquiry.
"MR. AADNESEN: Yes, your Honor, I
think-"
In Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, C.C.A.
lOth, 118 F. 2d 836, 841, the court stated:
"It is admissible merely as some evidence of
the nature of the thing in question because it indicates what is the influence of the thing on the
ordinary person in that same situation."
In both the Erickson and the Karren cases, supra,
there was evidence of the customs and practices of other
stores in Salt Lake City having terrazzo entranceways.
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Also, such evidence was introduced in the case of Brody
v. Albert Lifson & Sons, Inc., supra.
In the case of Royer v. Najarian, supra, plaintiff's
expert testified that it was a common thing in Rhode Island and everywhere to have terrazzo entranceways covered with rubber mats and that there was a sloping terrazzo floor in the passageway of the New IJ!dustrial
Trust Building and that he had seen mats on that floor
after a storm when the inside was wet. This evidence
was allowed.
In the case of Deschamps et al. v. L. Bamberger & Co.,
supra, exception was taken to the trial court allowing
evidence over defendant's objection of the use of mats
on the floors of the vestibules in similarly constructed
places in the vicinity on the theory that such facts were
not in issue under the pleadings, or the plaintiff's theory
of liability. The court held that where the complaint
charged defendant with maintaining a dangerous floor,
the evidence concerning mats was proper.
The theory of admissibility of evidence of the voluntary conduct of others is expressed in Paragraph 461,
Wigmore on Evidence. Wigmore cites as examples, a
person indoors observing whether or not passers by have
their umbrellas lifted to determine if it is raining; a
person, in ascertaining if a hill is too icy to attempt it in
his car without tire chains observing whether or not
other cars lacking chains are skidding; a person observSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing work1nen in a powder factory wearing felt shoes in-.
fering that the tendency of the powder was to explode
frmn the concussion or friction of ordinary shoes.
So in the case at bar the conduct of other store owner:-;
in the vicinity with regard to their terrazzo entranceways
in wet weather tends to show the propensity of terrazzo
surfaces to become slick when wet and that rubber mats
and feldspar are practical and available ways in which to
obviate the dangerous condition.
(b) DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCEDED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL TO BE "PERFECTLY ADMISSIBLE", AND STIPULATED TO BE TRUE.

Counsel for defendant states in his brief at page 19:
"Admittedly the defendant J. C. Penney Company used mats and feldspar during inclement
weather just as they were used by other stores on
Main Street including W. T. Grant."
Furthermore, counsel stated during the trial "We
think it perfectly admissible to show that, in the comInunity if he desires, we would be glad to stipulate that
mats and feldspar are used on terrazzo during inclement
weather."
Also the evidence as to the custom and practice of
other stores in this cmnmunity was illicited from the
various witnesses without objection by defense counsel.
Such evidence was offered in evidence in support of
plaintiff's contention that J. C. Penney's Co. should likeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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wise have such a custom and practice. When counsel conceded that J. C. Penney's Co. did have such a custom and
practice any possible prejudice to defendant from custom
and practice evidence vanished. The ultimate fact had
been admitted. There remained only the question of
whether defendant had negligently failed to follow its
own custom and practice, and whether this failure was
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
In State v. Olsen, (1945) 160 P. 2d 427, 108 U. 377,
defendant was being prosecuted for n1anslaughter. The
evidence was that defendant had fallen asleep at the
wheel of an automobile. Defendant admitted all the facts
of the accident. On appeal defendant complained of the
allowance in evidence of a map containing testimonial
statements, said document having been prepared by one
of the witnesses. This court stated:
"Because all of the facts of the accident in
question were admitted by defendant we can see
no prejudicial error in the use of this map and
for this reason shall not enter into an academic
discussion of the rules governing the use of maps
and other testimonial documents."
Another Utah case is Sc.Jvofield v. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Institute, (1934) 39 P. 2d 342, 85 U. 281. This
was a suit for pension under an agreement between
defendant and plaintiff. At the trial plaintiff introduced
letters from defendant as to the allowance of the pension.
On appeal defendant complained of the allowance of such
letters in evidence. This court held that the letters
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were ad1nissible and further stated that since there was
no dispute in the record of the facts recited :in the letters
that no prejudice could result to the defendant.
Defendant in the case at bar is in the anomalous
position of complaining about evidence concerning custom and practice in this connnunity when defendant
admits that it had such a custom in its own store. The
evidence of the rapid inquiry made by Mr. Davies as
to whether or not the rubber mats were out and his
frantic effort to get feldspar on the terrazzo indicate
that someone had failed to discharge his responsibility
and that defendant had failed to follow its own custom.
In the face of defendant's admissions and the undisputed
evidence defendant could not possibly have been prejudiced by the admission in evidence of the customs and
practices of other stores in the community.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT IS FORECLOSED FROM OBJECTING TO
ADMISSION OF LOCAL CUSTOM AND USAGE EVIDENCE
BY COUNSEL'S F AlLURE TO EXCEPT TO SUCH EVIDENCE AND BY HIS F AlLURE TO REQUEST A LIMITING
INSTRUCTION.

At page 19 of his brief counsel for defendant states:
"1\{r. DeWeese was both directly and indirectly allowed to set a standard of care by comparison."
In his next breath counsel admits that J. C. Penney
Company "used mats and feldspar during inclement
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weather, just as they were used by other stores on Main
Street including W. T. Grants."
Counsel then states at page 21 of his brief:

r:.

1
';

"The testimony admitted in evidence was not
explained by the court as to its purpose nor was
it commented on in the instructions."
Counsel for defendant at no time suggested to the trial
court that the purpose of the evidence of custom and
practice should be limited. At the conclusion of the evidence he submitted no requested instruction concerning
such evidence. But now he states that the evidence was
not limited to a specific purpose. If the evidence was admissible for any purpose it was proper and if counsel
for defendant wished the evidence to be limited to a
specific purpose it was his duty to so indicate to the court
both at the time the evidence was admitted and later
when he submitted his requested instructions. Counsel
for defendant took neither of these expedients. Furthermore, counsel has never quite determined even yet just
how the concededly admissible evidence of custom and
practice should have been limited.
In Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. I, page 300, paragraph 13, it is said:
"In other words, when an evidentiary fact
is offered for one purpose, and becomes admissible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it
in that capacity, it is not inadmissible because it
does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some
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other capacity and because the jury n1ight improperly consider it in the latter capacity. This
doctrine, though involving certain risks, is indispensable as a practical rule:

* * * *
"Here the only question can ·be what the
proper means are for avoiding the risk of misusing the evidence. It is uniformly conceded that
the instruction of the court suffices for that purpose; and the better opinion is that the opponent
of the evidence must ask for that instruction;
otherwise, he may be supposed to have waived it
as unnecessary for his protection:"

(Citing numerous cases including State v. Greene,
33 U. 497, 94 P. 987).
The Utah law is set forth in State v. Greene, 33 l7.
497, 94 P. 987. That case involved a prosecution for
adultery. The Court admitted in evidence over objection
a deed wherein defendant and Grace D. Greene were
grantors with an acknowledgment stating "personally
appeared before me Webster Greene and Grace D.
Greene, husband and wife, the signers of the above instrument." The objection was to the use of the evidence
for any purpose. The defendant made no request for
an instruction to limit the use that the jury could make
of the evidence. This court conceded that this evidence
was inadmissible as a declaration of Grace D. Greene but
held that it was admissible as an admission by defendant. The court states at P. 988:
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" 'It follows that an objection to evidence,
where a part is competent and part incompetent,·
may be overruled without available error, in
cases where counsel interposes the objection to
all the evidence.' * * * And furthermore, the rule
as declared by the great weight of authority seems
to be that evidence which is competent for certain
purposes, and is incompetent for other purposes,
but is admitted generally, it is incumbent upon
the party objecting to its reception, if he desires to have the effect of such evidence limited
to the specific purpose for which it is admissible,
to ask the court to inform the jury by appropriate instructions as to the purpose for which they
may consider the evidence, and, if he fails to make
the request, he cannot afterwards be heard to
complain." (Citing numerous cases.)
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented jury questions as to defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The jury with the approval of the trial court resolved
these issues in plaintiff's favor. The record reveals that
no improper testimony was admitted in evidence by the
court, and no exceptions to the complained of evidence
were taken by defense counsel. Furthermore, counsel
for defendant has utterly failed to discharge his burden
of showing that defendant was prejudiced by any act or
ruling of the trial court. Counsel made no such complaint
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as
of prejudice at the time of trial, and asked for no instruction limiting the use of any evidence. Under the foregoing circumstances it is respectfully submitted that the
Erickson and Karren cases should be reaffirmed by the
sustaining of plaintiff's verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
JOHN L. BLACK
Counsel for Respondent

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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